The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Defining Commercial Activity and Direct Effects Jurisdiction by Hagedorn, Robert Byrd
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 1 Article 4
1-1-1985
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Defining
Commercial Activity and Direct Effects
Jurisdiction
Robert Byrd Hagedorn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Robert Byrd Hagedorn, Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Defining Commercial Activity and Direct Effects Jurisdiction, 25
Santa Clara L. Rev. 105 (1985).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss1/4
COMMENTS
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT:
DEFINING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY AND DIRECT
EFFECTS JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA or Act)' was en-
acted by Congress in 1976 because "American citizens are increas-
ingly coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by
foreign states."2 The Act codifies the restrictive principle of sovereign
immunity.' The FSIA is intended to ensure that United States citi-
zens "will have access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary legal
disputes"4 that arise from their business interactions with foreign en-
tities. This access is attained by providing state and federal courts
jurisdiction over any foreign sovereigns and their entities which have
engaged in "commercial activities"' with Americans. Among the
most important substantive requirements under the Act is determin-
ing what constitutes a commercial activity.
The determination of what constitutes commercial activity is
crucial because a foreign sovereign's immunity is "restricted" to
those acts which are noncommercial, governmental actions. There-
fore, a plaintiff's cause of action must arise out of a foreign sover-
eign's commercial activities in order for the sovereign to be amenable
to suit in the United States.
In addition, the Act provides for the exercise of jurisdiction by
the state and federal courts in all claims "based upon ...an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a com-
mercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere ...[which] causes a
direct effect in the United States."' This clause operates as a type of
© 1985 by Robert Byrd Hagedorn
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.].
3. See infra text accompanying notes 6-10.
4. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6605.
5. See infra text accompanying note 13.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) cl. 3 (1976) (emphasis added).
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jurisdictional long-arm statute in actions against foreign states.' The
United States Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes a
"commercial activity" or a "direct effect" for purposes of the Act.'
This comment will attempt to define these terms.
First, this comment will address the courts' sometimes confused
application of the term "commercial activity" and will propose a
concise analytical approach to characterize what constitutes the
"commercial activity" of a foreign state which would deprive it of its
sovereign immunity under the Act. Second, this comment will ex-
plore the various interpretations adopted by courts in their applica-
tions of the term "direct effect" and will examine the relationship of
the Act to traditional due process jurisdictional standards. The anal-
ysis will propose a new synthesized test for "direct effects" jurisdic-
tion. Finally, this comment will attempt to elucidate the distinction
Section 1605(a)(2) provides three exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state. The third exception concerns direct effects caused by extraterritorial acts. The first two
clauses concern a foreign state's activities within the territory of the United States. These first
two clauses are not addressed by this comment.
Section 1605(a)(2) provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case . . . (2) in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.
In addition to these commercial exceptions, a foreign state may explicitly or implicitly
waive its immunity in other ways. For example, a foreign state may waive its immunity by
treaty or by violating international law. For a complete list of statutory exceptions, see 28
U.S.C. § 1605 in its entirety.
7. A long-arm statute extends the reach of a state court's jurisdiction beyond the territo-
rial limits of the state. See infra notes 73 and 75 for a discussion of the due process limitations
on the extraterritorial reach of long-arm statutes.
8. The United States Supreme Court had its first opportunity to address the terms
"commercial activity" and "direct effect" in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep.
of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), but the Court denied certiorari. 454 U.S. 1148
(1982). See infra text accompanying notes 66-69 for a discussion of Texas Trading.
The Court had another opportunity to define these terms in Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1963 (1983). However, in Verlinden, the Court limited its discus-
sion to the constitutionality of the FSIA. The Court held that the Act's authorization of juris-
diction over actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns on nonfederal claims was
constitutional. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Verlinden and direct
effects jurisdiction. See also Jurisdiction-Foreign Sovereign Immunity-An Action Brought
By an Alien Against a Foreign Sovereign Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
"Arises Under" Federal Law, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 201 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdic-
tion] (discussion of the Verlinden decision).
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between the Act's exceptions to immunity jurisdiction and "mini-
mum contacts" analysis."
In order to examine these issues it is necessary to begin with a
brief discussion of sovereign immunity and the FSIA.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FSIA
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law under
which the domestic courts of one sovereign state refuse to exercise
jurisdiction over another sovereign state. The courts of the United
States first recognized the international doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden."0 In Schooner, Chief
Justice Marshall upheld a plea of sovereign immunity which was
supported by the executive branch. The immunity provided to for-
eign states," and recognized by the United States, was virtually ab-
solute until the "Tate Letter" of 1952.2
The "Tate Letter" marks the Department of State's adoption of
the so-called "restrictive principle" of sovereign immunity. This
principle "restricts" a foreign state's immunity to those suits which
involve the foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and it does not
extend immunity to suits based on the state's commercial or private
acts (jure questionis).'s After 1952, sovereign entities were held im-
mune from the judicial review of the United State's courts whenever
the Department of State so instructed a court. 4 Under this proce-.
9. The exceptions to immunity provide for jurisdiction over a foreign state, while the
"minimum contacts" analysis addresses jurisdiction over individuals in domestic cases. Many
courts applying the FSIA have confused and intertwined these two jurisdictional concepts. See
infra notes 72-82, 91-96 and accompanying text. See also text accompanying notes 131-32.
10. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1982).
11. The term "foreign state" includes any organ of a foreign state and any corporate
entity a majority of whose shares are owned by a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. §1603 (1976). See
also Corporation Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp. 615, 619
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
In this comment, the term "foreign state" is used interchangeably with "foreign
sovereign."
For a discussion of the meaning of the term "foreign state" as reflected in the case law,
see Rubenstein, Alienage Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 17 INT'L LAW 283 (Fall 1983).
12. See 26 DEPT. ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
In the "Tate Letter," Jack B. Tate, the State Department's acting legal advisor, informed
the Attorney General that international adherence to the theory of absolute immunity was to
cease as a practice of the United States. Under the absolute theory, a foreign state would not
be subject to judicial review without its expressed consent. In lieu of the old absolute theory,
Tate announced the State Department's adoption of the most recent restrictive theory. Id.
13. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6605. See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law
§§ 46-60 (1969).
14. 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law §§ 46-47 (1969).
1985]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
dure, decisions pertaining to a foreign sovereign's amenability to suit
were necessarily premised on political decisions made by the execu-
tive branch of the federal government. Then in 1976, Congress en-
acted the FSIA.
The Act codifies the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity
adopted by the "Tate Letter." Moreover, through this legislation
Congress intended to transfer from the State Department to the
courts the decisional power as to whether or not a particular foreign
state is immune from suit. The purpose of this transfer was to assure
litigants that this crucial decision would be made by a neutral judge
on purely legal grounds and removed from diplomatic pressures.15
Further, Congress intended that the Act should provide for the crea-
tion of a uniform body of law in actions against foreign sovereigns."6
Numerous years have passed since the enactment of the FSIA.
However, uniform application of "direct effects" jurisdiction has not
been achieved. Also, access to the courts, vis-a-vis the amenability of
a sovereign to suit, remains uncertain because of some confusion
with regard to the determination of what constitutes a "commercial
activity."
III. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY: THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY IS
THE CRUCIAL DETERMINATION
A. The Plaintiffs Role in the Activity is Indicative of the Activity's
Nature
The threshold question under the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity is whether or not the underlying transaction is commer-
cial. This determination is "[pirobably the most important single is-
sue" under the Act.' 7 If the transaction is commercial, then the anal-
ysis may proceed to determine whether the effect in, or contact with,
the United States is that which is statutorily required by the Act'" to
allow a court to assert its jurisdiction over a foreign state. A court
cannot look simply at the character of the parties, and without con-
sider'ation, proclaim that an act by a governmental body is always a
15. See National American Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 638
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff d, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); see also H.R. REP., supra note 2, at
6605-06; 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
16. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6631. In order to promote this goal, 28 U.S.C. §
1441(d) provides for removal from a state court to a federal court of any civil action involving
a foreign state.
17. Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 48 (1978).
18. See supra note 6.
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public act. Nor can jurisdiction be exercised indiscriminately over all
entities. A given entity may at times engage in commercial activities,
in which it would not be immune, and on other occasions it may take
actions "whose essential nature is public or governmental."'19
Therefore, the Act provides that "the commercial character of
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose."20 This characterization of the activity by its
nature is the specifically prescribed mode of analysis. As a rule of
thumb, if the activity is normally carried on for a profit, then its
commercial nature may be assumed.21 Also, the existence of a con-
tractual relationship is often indicative of a commercial activity. 2
Conversely, if the activity is one in which only a sovereign en-
tity can engage, then it is probably not commercial." With these
guidelines in mind, characterization of the nature of an activity as
commercial or noncommercial ought to be fairly simple. However,
some courts have misapplied the analysis. The most glaring misap-
plication of this test occurred in Gittler v. German Information
Center.24
Gittler involved a breach of contract action. The plaintiff, a
widow, sought to recover unpaid compensation in connection with
work which her late husband allegedly performed on documentary
films while in the defendant's employ. The films were intended to
foster cultural relations between the United States and West Ger-
many. The purpose was clearly political-the enhancement of rela-
tions between two sovereign states.2 5 On the other hand, the nature
of the activity underlying the cause of action was private. There was
a contractual relationship. However, the Gittler court noted that the
contract arose initially from a public act-the political decision to
19. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6615.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6614-
15. See generally De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D.La.
1981).
21. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6615. "[Vjirtually all commercial acts performed by
private businessmen will be deemed commercial when performed by foreign states." G. Kahale
& M. Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against
Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 211, 243 (1979). The problem still remains,
however, as to what constitutes a "commercial activity."
22. Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D.Tex. 1982).
23. International Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp.
553, 567 (C.D.Cal. 1979), affid on other grounds, 647 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
24. 408 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1978). Gittler is one of the very few state court cases applying
the Act.
25. Id. at 602.
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produce the films. Therefore, the court reasoned that the actual na-
ture of the transaction was public."' Accordingly, the action was dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. This result was grossly erroneous.
The specific activity in Gittler was employment and compensa-
tion and therefore it was commercial in nature.2 7 The overall pur-
pose of the commercial activity was irrelevant under proper FSIA
analysis. The decedent was employed in a private capacity. He was
making documentary films, an activity which by its nature is com-
mercial. Therefore, jurisdiction ought to have been upheld by the
Gittler court.
Congress sought to create increased access to the courts by mak-
ing it "difficult for defendants engaged in commercial activity ... to
invoke successfully sovereign immunity when sued for underlying
commercial misdeeds." 28 Initially, there is a presumption that juris-
diction exists.29 The defendant has the initial burden of showing that
it is a foreign state and that its activities are sovereign in nature.80
Despite the legislative intent and the procedural burdens imposed,
the Gittler court's error was to focus on the purpose of the overall
activity, instead of the nature of the specific transaction at issue.8
26. Id.
27. Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
28. Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1983).
Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense.
29. The defendant has the burden of proving that one of the Act's exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity is applicable. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1499
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
30. In its opinion, the court relied on Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). Victory was a pre-FSIA decision in which the court articulated its
belief that focusing on the nature of the activity led to "astonishing results, such as the hold-
ings ...that purchases of bullets or shoes for the army, the erection of fortifications for
defense, or the rental of a house for an embassy, are private acts." Id. at 359 (emphasis
added). See also Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1971) (dictum)
(foreign government's contract to purchase ammunition is governmental).
Interestingly, the legislative history of the Act addresses these very same issues and
reaches quite different conclusions:
[I]t is the essentially commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is criti-
cal. Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or equipment
for its armed forces or to construct a government building constitutes a commer-
cial activity. The same would be true of a contract to make repairs on an em-
bassy building. Such contracts [are] . . .commercial contracts, even if their ulti-
mate object is to further a public function.
H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6615.
See Von Mehren, supra note 17, for a discussion of Victory and the FSIA. See also
Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity, 85
COM. L.S. 228 (June-July 1980).
31. At the time even the Department of State indicated to the court that it believed that
the activities were of commercial nature. 408 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (1978).
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A more recent employment case reached the same result as in
Gittler, and the action was dismissed. However, unlike Gittler, the
dismissal was proper under the Act. That case points out how an
employment situation can appropriately be held to be a public activ-
ity under the Act.
That case, Broadbent v. Organization of American States
(OAS) 2 involved an allegedly wrongful discharge of seven staff mem-
bers of the international health organization's General Secretariat.
The discharged employees were United States citizens and foreign
nationals with permanent United States residency. The nature of the
transaction concerned an employment relationship. However, the
OAS court reasoned that an international organization is very much
akin to a foreign state. Therefore, such an organization is a quasi-
sovereign entity."3 Consequently, the internal employment and ad-
ministrative affairs of the OAS correspond to the internal affairs of a
government bureaucracy. 4 In addition, despite the apparent private
quality of an employer-employee relationship, the court held that the
true nature of the activity in OAS was indeed governmental, or more
aptly-public. Since the activity was found to be public, the OAS
was immune to the judicial review of the courts of the United
States."5
The differences between the Gittler and the OAS cases empha-
sizes the paramount importance of a careful analysis. In Gittler the
plaintiff helped in the production of documentary films. This em-
ployment is private in nature. The nature of the work product was
private. Film production and employment are not unique activities of
sovereign entities.
The plaintiffs in OAS, however, were employed to aid in the
formulation and implementation of policy for an international quasi-
sovereign organization. In contrast with the Gittler case, the nature
32. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org. 668 F.2d 547
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
33. In fact, the district court in the same action held that international organizations
were indeed sovereign entities. However, since the FSIA makes no mention of or reference to
international organizations, the court reached a questionable conclusion. The court determined
that not only were international organizations sovereign entities, they were also absolutely
immune from liability. Broadbent v. OAS, 481 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D.C.D.C. 1978), af'd on
other grounds, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C.Cir. 1980).
The OAS court of appeals declined to reach this question. Instead, it held that the activity
was public in nature. Hence, OAS was immune from prosecution under both the absolute and
restrictive theories of sovereign immunity. OAS, 628 F.2d at 32-33.
34. For a discussion of the sovereign nature of an international organization see supra
note 33.
35. OAS, 628 F.2d at 35-36.
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of the organization was governmental and the nature of the plain-
tiffs' employment functions were also governmental. The nature of
the respective plaintiff's employment activities is the determining
factor.
Discussion of commercial activity in a nonemployment situation
ought to further clarify the "nature" and "purpose" distinctions
which this analysis requires.
B. The Relationship of the Parties
The relationship of the parties indicates whether the nature of
the activity is commercial or noncommerical as is demonstrated by
the following cases. The claims in Arango v. Guzman Travel Advi-
sors Corp.,6 arose from an aborted package tour from the United
States to the Dominican Republic. The plaintiffs purchased their
tickets from and flew aboard the defendant state airline (Domini-
cana).3 7 When the plaintiffs' plane arrived in the Dominican Repub-
lic, immigration officials denied their entry into the country. 8 On
instructions from these officials, the employees of Dominicana forci-
bly returned the plaintiffs to the United States.
The Arango court reasoned that the nature of a tour and of an
airline operation is on its face commercial. 9 Therefore, the court
upheld the exercise of jurisdiction regarding the Arango's breach of
warranty and breach of contract causes of action. However, with re-
gard to their "involuntary re-routing" the court held that the entire
cause of action could not lie because the immigration officials were
enforcing the laws of the Dominican Republic when they instructed
the Dominicana employees to return the Arangos to the United
States. Consequently, the nature of this latter activity was political as
it concerned governmental decisions by public officials. Accordingly,
this cause of action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
Finally, Maritime International Nominees v. Republic of
Guinea,41 concerned a contract dispute between a Liechtenstein cor-
poration and the Republic of Guinea. The district court incorrectly
approached the question of commercial activity. The court focused
36. 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
37. The full name of the state airline is Compania Dominicana de Aviacion. Id. at
1373.
38. Apparently the plaintiffs were included on an official list of undesirable aliens. Id.
39. Id. at 1379-80.
40. Id. at 1379.
41. 505 F. Supp. 141 (D.C.D.C. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
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on the sum of the parties's activities which were connected with the
United States. The district court held that in the aggregate, numer-
ous meetings in the United States, plus the defendant's retention of a
United States shipping company, constituted commercial activity.4
This court, however, looked to the wrong factors in reaching its
determination.
Instead of focusing specifically on the nature of the activity un-
derlying the cause of action, the Maritime court looked to the num-
ber of contacts which the defendant had with the United States. Yet,
the quantity and/or quality of contacts with the United States is ir-
relevant at this juncture in the FSIA analysis.4 The district court
confused the first step of analysis with the second step; that of deter-
mining if the requisite nexus with the United States is present." At
this first point, characterizing the activity as commercial or noncom-
mercial must be the only concern.
The underlying transaction in Maritime was a contract to ship
bauxite from the Republic of Guinea.45 The nature of this contrac-
tual relationship was commercial.4 Guinea was selling its bauxite to
competitive purchasers. Therefore, if the requisite nexus with the
United States existed, the court should have exercised jurisdiction
over the Republic of Guinea.
C. An Approach to Commercial Activity
As these cases illustrate, despite the apparent simplicity of the
"nature of the underlying activity" standard, many courts have mis-
understood their role in a FSIA analysis. The court's proper func-
tion is to first focus on the specific activity or transaction which un-
derlies the cause of action. The defendant's general organizational
nature, whether commercial or governmental in character, is irrele-
42. 505 F. Supp. at 143.
43. A discussion of the quality and/or quantity of contacts with the United States is
relevant to a discussion of the "minimum contacts," personal jurisdiction component of the
FSIA analysis. See infra notes 73, 75 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 6.
45. The plaintiff brought the action in order to confirm a previous arbitration award
made on the contract to ship bauxite. 505 F. Supp. at 142.
46. The court of appeals reached this same conclusion without reviewing the district
court's analysis. Instead, it held that the injury/loss of expected profits was not foreseeable.
Therefore, the defendant arguably would not have expected to be haled into a U.S. court. The
action was dismissed on this basis. Maritime Int'l Nominees v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For a discussion of this court's misapplication of the direct
effects standard, see infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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vant.' 7 Moreover, the existence of or absence of any contacts with
the United States is also irrelevant at this stage.
The proper judicial approach to commercial activity characteri-
zation begins with an analysis of the specific underlying activity.48 If
the activity can be performed by a private person for a profit and/or
if it concerns some kind of contractual relationship, then its nature is
presumptively private. Conversely, if the activity is uniquely sover-
eign, such as nationalization, then it is presumptively
governmental.
Next, a court should focus on the respective parties to the ac-
tion. The various parties' functions in the carrying on of the activity
are important. If the plaintiff's role is administrative or policy-ori-
ented, then despite the existence of a contract, the activity's actual
nature is public.
Neither a more comprehensive analysis nor a static definition of
what constitutes a commercial activity has been put forth because to
do so would be unwise. Congress intended that the FSIA be flexible
and adapt to changing international relationships.5 ° Therefore, this
analysis is intended to be applicable to all commercial activity ques-
tions. A more rigid analysis would very likely stifle access to the
courts.
If each of the above steps in the analysis indicates that the activ-
ity is commercial, then the foreign state has no immunity from suit
in the United States. Consequently, if the activity bears the necessary
nexus with the United States; for instance, if it causes a direct effect
in the United States, then a court may exercise jurisdiction over the
foreign sovereign.
IV. DIRECT EFFECTS JURISDICTION UNDER THE FSIA
A. The Restatement of Law's Approach to Effects Jurisdiction
1. The Locus of the Injury Determines the Magnitude of the
Effect
Section 1605(a)(2) of the Act provides that a foreign sovereign
is not immune from suit if the act associated with the commercial
activity outside of the United States causes a direct effect in the
47. 621 F.2d at 1379.
48. See supra text accompanying note 20.
49. See supra note 45.
50. See H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6615; United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F.
Supp. 609, 611 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
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United States. Thus, once a court has determined that the foreign
entity was involved in a commercial activity, it must then determine
if the sovereign's act had a direct effect in the United States.51 The
Act itself does not provide any guidelines as to what constitutes a
direct effect. The legislative history to the Act, however, provides
some interpretive assistance.
The Act's history indicates that this direct effects clause is to be
interpreted with regard to the principles set forth in section 18 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States."2 Section 18 provides that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and
causes an effect within its territory, if . . . the effect within its
territory is substantial ... [and] it occurs as a direct and fore-
seeable result of the conduct outside the territory.83
Several courts have greatly relied on this restatement. 4
The Restatement indicates that the effect of the sovereign's ac-
tions must be "substantial, direct and foreseeable" in order to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. Once again facially simple
criteria are provided. Unfortunately, however, several divergent ap-
plications of the "substantial, direct and foreseeable" test have
emerged.
One line of cases emphasizes the "substantial" component of the
test. This line of cases looks to the locus of the injury to determine
how direct or substantial the effect is. In fact, the place of the imme-
diate injury is dispositive of jurisdiction in these cases. The locus of
the injury tends to outweigh any discussion of the Act's effects in the
United States. In a recent case, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria,5 Nigeria had contracted with over seventy cement suppli-
ers. Nigeria needed the cement as part of a major national develop-
51. It may also look to other nexus requirements besides that of "direct effect." See
supra note 6.
52. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6618.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18 (1965) (emphasis
added). Comment (f) to § 18 states the same thing rather succinctly: "The effect within the
territory must be substantial and occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory."
54. See generally Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
affid on other grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461
F. Supp. 384 (D.C. Del. 1978); Ohntrup Firearms Center, Inc. v. MaKina Ve Kimya Endus-
trisi Kurumu, 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D.Pa. 1981).
55. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
affd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
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ment effort. 6 Verlinden B.V., a Dutch corporation, was one of the
numerous cement suppliers. Pursuant to a contract, Central Bank of
Nigeria5 7 established a letter of credit through Morgan Guaranty of
New York, in favor of the plaintiff. However, when deliveries of the
cement began, the incoming shipments clogged the Nigerian ports.
This kept out more necessary commodities so Nigeria took steps to
cut the flow of cement deliveries into the ports. 8
Central Bank of Nigeria advised Morgan Guaranty to unilater-
ally amend the letter of credit. The amendment required that Verlin-
den B.V. receive prior approval before entering a Nigerian port.
Plaintiff had contracted to purchase cement from a third party and
thereby exposed itself to potential liability if Nigeria refused to
tender payment, so this action was brought for the alleged anticipa-
tory breach of the letter of credit." The Verlinden trial court held
that the repudiation by Central Bank of the letter of credit was in-
sufficiently direct to confer jurisdiction over the defendant.60
The effect in the United States was found by the court to be "at
most speculative and remote."61 No harm occurred in the United
States. Moreover, the district court concluded that no evidence
proved that Morgan Guaranty had acted as the defendant's agent.6 2
In addition, that court found that Nigeria had not availed itself of
the protections of New York law.6" Thus, in regard to this activity,
Nigeria had practically no contacts with the United States. The trial
court, in fact, stated that the only contact with the United States was
a letter of credit, established through an American bank, which was
never issued. All other aspects of the transaction took place outside of
the United States. Finally, because the letter of credit was repudiated
by Nigeria in Nigeria, there was not a direct effect in the United
56. 488 F. Supp. at 626.
57. Central Bank of Nigeria is an instrumentality of the Federal Rep. of Nigeria. Cen-
tral Bank performs functions similar to those of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Verlinden, 647
F.2d at 322 n.4.
58. Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 892, 896
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff d, Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria 647 F.2d
300 (2d Cir. 1981).
59. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1288.
60. Id. at 1298.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1299. Morgan Guaranty merely "advised" the letter of credit. It did not con-
firm the letter of credit. A confirmed letter of credit would have required that Morgan Guar-
anty pay the face amount itself in any instance in which Nigeria failed to pay. Id.
63. Nigeria did not avail itself of New York law because neither it nor its agents had
entered the United States with regard to the specific transaction. The sole contact with New
York, the letter of credit with Morgan Guaranty, was too remote to constitute a purposeful
availment. 488 F. Supp. at 1298. See infra notes 73, 75.
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States." All effects occurred elsewhere; there was no United States
plaintiff, citizen or resident, who arguably could have been injured."
Conversely, Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Re-
public of Nigeria,"" a case quite similar to Verlinden, reached the
opposite conclusion. The plaintiffs in Texas Trading were United
States companies which had contracted to sell cement to Nigeria.
The facts underlying the cause of action are identical to those in
Verlinden. The United States residency of the plaintiffs, however,
enabled the Texas Trading court to uphold jurisdiction over the for-
eign sovereign. 67 The Texas Trading court supported its decision by
noting in dicta, that Nigerian officials made frequent visits to Mor-
gan Guaranty in New York and that, in its opinion, Morgan Guar-
anty was an agent of Central Bank."
This dicta contained in the Texas Trading opinion is in keep-
ing with Congress' desire that "a degree of contact beyond that...
[of mere] U.S. citizenship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff"" be
found before a court exercises jurisdiction. The supplemental find-
ings of the court, which were also noted in dicta, provided the addi-
tional contacts that the court needed in order to assert jurisdiction.
2. The Foreseeability of the Injury is Dispositive
Another line of cases applying the Restatement's "substantial,
direct and foreseeable" test, emphasizes the "substantial and foresee-
able" aspects of the test. Maritime International Nominees v. Re-
public of Guinea7 0 is the most recent case which applies this mode of
analysis. As was noted above,"' the Maritime court dismissed the ac-
tion for lack of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff had sought to have a prior arbitration award for
loss of expected profits confirmed by the court. The Maritime court
reasoned, however, that a suit on this cause of action was not fore-
seeable. Had the action been one for compensation for services ren-
64. 488 F. Supp. at 1298.
65. The district court reasoned that Morgan Guaranty was not injured because it had
only advised the letter of credit. Had a letter of credit been confirmed by Morgan Guaranty,
thereby exposing Morgan Guaranty to potential liability, then Morgan Guaranty, a United
States entity, may have been injured by Nigeria's unilateral amendment of the letter of credit.
Id. at 1294.
66. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
67. 647 F.2d at 312.
68. Id. at 314-15.
69. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6616.
70. See supra note 41.
71. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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dered, then the cause of action would have been foreseeable because
the defendant would reasonably have expected the plaintiffs to seek
some redress for their lack of remuneration."' The court of appeals
impliedly concluded, that if the type of cause of action had been fore-
seeable to the defendant, the action would have been maintainable.
This reasoning is premised on the belief that if the injury is foresee-
able, then the effect is substantial.
It is not clear that this belief has any legal or practical founda-
tion. Assuming arguendo that it does indeed have merit, it still is not
appropriate to a "direct effects" analysis. Such analysis places too
much emphasis on the due process "minimum contacts" require-
ments of International Shoe Co. v. Washington7 and its progeny.
Maritime, and the cases applying the Maritime reasoning, lost sight
of the rationale behind the "direct effect" language of the Act. These
courts merely examine the number of United States contacts,7 4 and
then, from the quality and quantity of the contacts, they determine
the degree of foreseeability that the defendant would have of being
haled before a United States court. If the traditional due process
components are present, then these courts assert jurisdiction. These
courts fail to consider whether or not the foreign defendants "pur-
posely availed" themselves of the "protections and privileges" ' of
72. Maritime, 693 F.2d at 1111.
73. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe permitted a state court to exercise personaljurisdiction over an out-of-state (foreign) corporation that did not make contracts, maintain an
office, or deliver goods in the state. Id. at 313. The Supreme Court held that under the due
process clause, jurisdiction may be exercised over a foreign defendant if the defendant has
established certain "minimum contacts" within the state such that maintenance of the suit does
not offend "notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316.
This due process concept of minimum contacts serves two functions. "It protects the de-
fendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns." World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980). Moreover, it "gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." Id. at 297. See Kane, Suing
Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 386-90 (1982).
See generally Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamen-
tal Test of Fairness, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 300 (1970). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 630-39 (2d ed. 1977); Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 9 Wisc.
L. REV. 28-38 (1969).
74. Maritime Int'l Nominees v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F. Supp. 141 (D.C.D.C.
1981). The Maritime district court stated flatly that the sum of the activities; including defen-
dant's employment of a United States shipper and numerous meetings between the parties in
the United States, constituted a commercial activity with an implied direct effect in the United
States. Id. at 143. The court simply concluded that a certain number of contacts constitutes a
direct effect.
75. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Due process requires that in order
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United States law.
The analysis of these courts, however, is inapposite. The sover-
eign immunity and due process determinations should be distinct.
Section 1605 of the FSIA provides for exceptions to a foreign state's
immunity.7 6 If a court determines that a foreign state has waived its
jurisdictional immunity, then components of the traditional due pro-
cess analysis should be interjected at that time and not before.
Sovereign immunity addresses whether or not the court is em-
powered to exercise its authority over a foreign sovereign. The due
process determination concerns personal jurisdiction in a domestic
matter, and is determined by a "minimum contacts" analysis." "The
statutory standard for determining non-immunity is [not] co-exten-
sive with the due process standard governing personal jurisdiction. '7'
In summary, the locus analysis stresses the exact location where
the injury occurred, rather than the resulting effect in the United
States. Also, the foreseeability approach emphasizes the foreseeabil-
ity of the defendant's being haled before a United States court by his
activity, instead of the effect of his activity in the United States. Each
of these analyses is oblivious of the FSIA's "direct effects" jurisdic-
tional standard. Direct effects jurisdiction is statutorily exercised
when an effect is felt within the territory of the United States.79
Residency of the plaintiff is irrelevant.
In fact, the effect need not affect a United States party in order
for the courts to exercise jurisdiction. The United States Supreme
Court has determined that under the Act the plaintiffs in the action
may be United States residents or aliens.80 Thus an action may lie
for a court to exercise its jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, that defendant must have pur-
posely availed himself of the protections and privileges of the forum state. Id. This is required
so that it will be foreseeable to the defendant that his "conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
76. See supra note 6.
77. See supra note 73.
78. Maritime, 693 F.2d at 1105. The Maritime court noted the difference between the
two analyses, but then it went ahead and applied them simultaneously.
79. See supra note 6.
80. In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), a unanimous
Court held that actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns, even on nonfederal
claims, were constitutionally permitted by the Act. Id. at 1973.
The Court reached this conclusion by noting that the Act provided more than mere access
to the courts. In fact, it regulated the types of actions to which foreign sovereigns are liable.
Therefore, a court must apply the FSIA guidelines (e.g., commercial activity and direct effects
jurisdiction), before any action against a foreign sovereign will be heard. This determination,
the Court held, involves the application of substantive federal law (the FSIA) because it deter-
mines whether a cause of action is available against a foreign sovereign. Therefore, any action
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between a foreign plaintiff and a foreign defendant. 8' Consequently,
these Restatement approaches place too great an emphasis on the
minimum contacts/due process requirements at the expense of an
appropriately applied "direct effects" standard.8" This serves to de-
prive some plaintiffs the access to the United States courts that Con-
gress expressly intended to provide.88
B. The District of Columbia's Long-arm Statute as a Guide to In-
terpretation of the Term "Direct Effects"
The SIA "provides, in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over
foreign states . . . patterned after the long-arm statute [which] Con-
gress enacted for the District of Columbia.""'
On the basis of this statement taken from the legislative history of
the Act, some courts have based their direct effects analysis directly
on the District of Columbia statute.8" That statute establishes that a
"court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts di-
rectly or by an agent, as to a claim of relief arising from the person's
• . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia."8 6 Courts
utilizing this statute in their FSIA analyses rely on prior construc-
tions of the District's statute by the District of Columbia courts.
East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra" is
representative of the cases applying this approach. 8 East Europe
Sales concerned a New York corporation's action against a
Romanian trading company. The plaintiff alleged that the foreign
company had interfered with a contract for the purchase of cement
between itself, a New York corporation, and a third party. The con-
against a foreign state necessarily "arises under" the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. Id.
Consequently, jurisdiction under the Act is automatically federal question jurisdiction. See
generally Jurisdiction, supra note 8.
81. See generally Maritime, 693 F.2d 1094; see also Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. 1097.
82. It should also be noted that the purposes of the Restatement § 18 and that of FSIA
§ 1605(a)(2) are incongruous. Section 18 provides for a legislature's ability to "prescribe a rule
of law." See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Conversely, the Aci is concerned with a court's ability to extend its jurisdiction over cer-
tain foreign defendants. The aim of the Restatement is legislative, while that of the Act is
judicial. In light of these distinctions, undue reliance on one in order to interpret the other will
surely create confusion.
83. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
84. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6612.
85. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 13-423 (West 1972).
86. Id.
87. 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
88. See also Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.C.D.C. 1978), affd mem.,
607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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tract was never actually entered into by the parties.8 9 The court
found that prior cases construing the District of Columbia statute
had held that negotiations alone were not a sufficient basis for "min-
imum contacts" jurisdiction. 90 Consequently, because the Act's con-
struction apparently parallels that of the statute, negotiations with-
out more were insufficient to constitute a "direct effect" in the
United States.9 The East Europe Sales court's analysis began and
ended at this point.
The court applied a backward analysis to the Act. It reviewed
what contacts were necessary for jurisdiction under the District of
Columbia statute. Then it relied on District cases. This was inap-
propriate because the District of Columbia statute is a long-arm
statute.
The District's statute provides for jurisdiction over a party who
is "transacting any business in"92 the territory of the District of Co-
lumbia. On the other hand, effects jurisdiction is concerned with ef-
fects in the United States of business transacted outside of the United
States. The purposes underlying each of these statutes is quite dis-
similar. The statutes are neither identical in terminology nor in ap-
plication. That these distinctions exist is not surprising, because the
Act was merely "patterned after" the District of Columbia's stat-
ute.93 Additionally, it should be noted that the quoted language from
the legislative history referred to section 1330(b) of the Act. Congress
did not address this comment to the "direct effects" provision of the
89. East Europe Sales, 467 F. Supp. at 385-86.
90. Id. at 388 (citing Textile Museum v. F. Eberstadt & Co., Inc., 440 F. Supp. 30
(D.C.D.C. 1977), Bueno v. La Compania Peruana de Radio-Difusion, 375 A.2d 6 (D.C.D.C.
1977)).
91. East Europe Sales, 467 F. Supp. at 388.
92. D.C. CODE ENCLYCL. § 13-423 (West 1972) (emphasis added).
93. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6612.
Section 1330 provides, in its entirety that:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as de-
fined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sec-
tions 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction upon subsection (a) where
service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
(c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a foreign state does
not confer personal jurisdiction with respect to any claim for relief not arising
out of any transaction or occurrence enumerated in sections 1605-1607 of this
title.
28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
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Act.9 4
Consequently, this reliance by some courts on the District of
Columbia long-arm statute is inappropriate to a direct effects
analysis. 95
C. A Direct Effect Does Not Have an Intervening Element
A third approach to the Act's section 1605(a)(2) "direct effect"
analysis looks to whether or not a superseding cause is present.
Thus, as the court in Upton v. Empire of Iran" stated, a direct
effect is an effect "which has no intervening element, but, rather,
flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption."9 Upton
involved a personal injury and wrongful death action between
United States citizens and Iran.
Two United States citizens were killed and a third was injured
when the roof of the terminal building at the Tehran airport col-
lapsed. The action was brought by the survivors of the two persons
killed and by the injured third person. Plaintiffs contended that
"[d]efendant's [failure to maintain the airport] . . caused the
deaths and injuries to Americans which caused direct effects in the
United States." 98 The Upton court correctly concluded that the con-
nection between the injuries sustained in Iran and the repercussions
in the United States-that is, pain and suffering of American citi-
zens-was too attenuated. The court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction. 9 The district court found there was no direct effect in
the United States.100
Any effect of the accident in the United States was caused by
the surviving plaintiff's return to the United States, and by the fortu-
ity that those killed were survived by persons in the United States.
United States residency alone is an insufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion.101 The personal injuries and the deaths were the direct result of
Iran's alleged negligence. Iran's negligence and the physical injuries
94. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6612.
95. Congress enacted both the FSIA and the District of Columbia long-arm statute.
They are both jurisdictional statutes. Therefore, the convenience of patterning the Act after the
prior statute is apparent, even though the aim of each statute is distinct.
96. 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.C.D.C. 1978), affd mem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
97. 459 F. Supp. at 266.
98. Id. (emphasis in original).
99. Id. In reaching its conclusion to dismiss the action the court also relied in the alter-
native on the District of Columbia long-arm statute analogy (citing Leaks v. Ex Lax, Inc., 424
F. Supp. 413 (D.C.D.C. 1976)).
100. 459 F. Supp 264, 266.
101. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6616. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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and deaths occurred in Iran. Therefore, there was not a direct effect
in the United States. 102
Another, more recent case applied this same analysis to an ac-
tion of a commercial nature. In re Rio Grande Transport, Inc.1 8
involved a collision between two ships in the high seas. The plain-
tiff's cargo ship, the Yellowstone, sank after colliding with an Alge-
rian ship in the Mediterranean Sea.'" Plaintiff, a United States cor-
poration, brought an action in admiralty for exoneration from or
limitation of its liability.10 5 Plaintiff asserted that subject matter ju-
risdiction existed since the loss of the Yellowstone created a direct
effect in the United States.
The Yellowstone was plaintiff's only vessel; it was plaintiff's
sole source of income.' 06 Therefore, with the ship's sinking, plain-
tiff's income was terminated. This loss of income, the Rio Grande
Transport court held, was a great and direct effect of the collision.'0
Therefore, jurisdiction existed under the direct effects clause of the
Act. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff was a United States resident
was not the only basis for jurisdiction. The Algerian government's
shipping company had other contacts with the United States.
The defendant's ships made systematic calls at United States
ports and defendant employed a United States agent to solicit busi-
ness.' 08 These contacts arose out of the same commercial activity and
underlying transaction upon which the cause of action was pre-
mised.' The commercial activity was Algeria's commercial ship-
ping. Consequently, this analysis satisfied the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Act." 0 The Algerian sovereign entity was held
amenable to suit. The court concluded its analysis by applying the
minimum contacts-due process standard for jurisdiction over the per-
son, and found that the due process standard was satisfied."'
The Texas Trading"' case applied a similar analysis. That
102. This conclusion can also be supported by utilizing the Restatement's "substantial"
language. Thus, any effect in the United States was de minimus and too remote to constitute a
direct effect. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
103. 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
104. Id. at 1157. The action was brought under Rule F of Supplemental Rules of Pro-
cedure for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. Id.
105. Id. at 1163.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. In re Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. at 1161.
109. See supra text accompanying note 20.
110. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
111. In re Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. at 1164. See supra notes 73, 75.
112. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the case see text accompanying
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court noted that the letter of credit was established by Central Bank
of Nigeria through Morgan Guaranty of New York. 1 It was to be
payable to the plaintiff in New York upon plaintiff's presentation of
the requisite documents. Therefore, the Texas Trading court con-
cluded that although the letter of credit was never issued, and al-
though Nigeria's repudiation of the letter of credit was initiated in
Nigeria, the effect of the repudiation was nevertheless directly felt in
New York."'
Morgan Guaranty would pay on the letter of credit only if the
plaintiff satisfied Nigeria's new requirements. Plaintiff was to re-
ceive permission from Nigeria prior to shipping the cement. Satisfac-
tion by plaintiff of this new requirement was impossible since the
shipment was en route. As a result, the plaintiff suffered an immedi-
ate/direct loss of income in the United States because of Nigeria's
actions.11
D. A Working Definition of Direct Effect
This examination of direct effects jurisdiction has shown that a
consensus currently does not exist in the courts as to the application
of direct effects analysis. The term "direct effect" has been variously
defined. In some courts it is viewed as an effect which is "substan-
tial, direct and foreseeable."'' In others, the locus of the most imme-
diate injury is considered to be dispositive of jurisdiction, apparently
without regard to any effect.117 Yet another line of cases equates di-
rect effects jurisdiction with traditional long-arm statutes.1 ' Finally,
still another analysis defines the term as an effect which flows from
an act in a straight line without any interrupting element.'" Each of
these methods of inquiry are affirmative approaches in that they
probe the rudimentary elements upon which each cause of action,
brought under the Act, is premised. However, only one of these
analyses, if any, properly examines each of the elements vis-a-vis
direct effects jurisdiction.
Those courts which depend on the Restatement of Foreign Re-
supra notes 66-69.
113. For a discussion of the facts of this case, which are similar to those in Verlinden,
see text accompanying supra notes 55-59.
114. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 312.
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 53-83.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 84-95.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 96-115.
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lations Law's terminology'" 0 either focus on the locus of the injury
or the foreseeability of the defendant being brought under the juris-
diction of a United States court. These factors are directed more to-
ward questions of due process and minimum contacts... than to ex-
ceptions to sovereign immunity. Certainly these factors are essential
components to a direct effects examination; however, they ought not
to be relied upon at the exclusion of other equally essential elements.
Further, reliance on interpretations of the District of Columbia long-
arm statute is subject to the same infirmities. This analysis is also
directed solely at resolving due process issues. None of these ap-
proaches adequately address jurisdiction under the Act as it differs
from traditional "minimum contacts" jurisdiction.
The approach which was first articulated by Upton12 2 and ap-
plied by the court in Rio Grande Transport, 21 most clearly approx-
imates the requirements of the Act. These cases focus on the causal
relationship between the activity abroad and its effects in the United
States. These courts looked to both the requirements of statutory im-
munity and to the requirements of due process. However, they did so
on an ad hoc basis. They did not develop a uniform analytical proce-
dure to structure their analysis.
Furthermore, the Upton court reached its conclusion on a seem-
ingly intuitive foundation. The causal relationship was facially too
attenuated. Thus, there was not a direct effect.124 Moreover, to but-
tress its intuition, the court employed the long-arm statute minimum
contacts mode of analysis.125 Thus, although the Upton court first
stated this causal approach, it was unclear as to the proper mode of
inquiry. Consequently, the court in Rio Grande Transport is the
only court which has actually utilized and relied on the causal
approach.
The Rio Grande Transport court properly noted that through
the Act, Congress desired to provide access to the courts.' 26 On this
120. See supra note 53.
121. See supra notes 73 and 75. See also text accompanying note 78.
122. 459 F. Supp. 264. The Upton court reasoned that a direct effect is something
"which has no intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line without deviation or
interruption." Id. at 266. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
123. 516 F. Supp. 1155. See supra text accompanying notes 103-111.
124. The district court quoted from the appellant's brief to the effect that the defen-
dant's negligence in Iran "caused the deaths and injuries to the Americans [in Iran, which in
turn] caused direct effects in the United States." 459 F. Supp. at 266 (emphasis omitted). On
its face, the effect in the United States was indirectly the result of the accident in Iran. This is
where the analysis ended.
125. See supra note 99.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
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basis, the court held that the collision abroad caused a loss of income
to a United States plaintiff which was sufficiently direct to provide
the plaintiff with access to a United States court. 2  Unfortunately,
the Rio Grande Transport court neglected to provide any other basis
for its decision. The Rio Grande Transport court, like the Upton
court, reached a seemingly instinctive decision without any specific
legal basis. Moreover, courts citing the Rio Grande Transport deci-
sion continue to rely on alternative modes of analysis. 28 Hence a
uniform approach to direct effects jurisdiction does not exist.
A direct effects test which is sensitive to the distinctions between
the jurisdictional evaluation required under section 1605(a)(2) 2 9
and the due process requirements necessary for minimum contacts
jurisdiction is needed in order to adequately approach direct effects
jurisdiction issues. The following inquiry procedure is suggested:
Is the effect in the United States direct?
a) Is the effect felt immediately by an aggrieved party in the
United States?
b) Are there any intervening elements or causes?
c) Is the effect in the United States substantial, or is it merely
de minimus?
If the answer to any of the questions above is negative, then a
foreign sovereign is not subject to the judicial review of the American
courts. If the response to each of these inquiries is affirmative, then a
court has jurisdiction over the action as provided in FSIA section
1605(a)(2). However, despite the finding that a foreign sovereign's
commercial activity caused a direct effect in the United States, a
court may still not exercise jurisdiction unless the due process re-
quirements for minimum contacts jurisdiction are satisfied.' 30
A court with statutory jurisdiction must also determine whether
the effect in the United States was merely fortuitous. In this determi-
nation the following inquiries must be addressed:
a) Is the sole basis for jurisdiction the United States residence or
citizenship of the plaintiff?
b) Does the cause of action arise out of a purposeful contact by
the defendant with the United States?
127. Rio Grande, 516 F. Supp. 1163.
128. See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In
Gibbons the plaintiff alleged that the Republic of Ireland had taken property in violation of
international law. Id. at 1104. In reaching'its decision, the court cited Rio Grande Transport,
but relied on the District of Columbia long-arm statute. Id. at 1113.
129. See supra note 6.
130. See supra notes 73, 75.
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c) Does the cause of action arise out of an activity which sys-
tematically brings the defendant into contact witif the United States?
This analysis combines the foreseeability component of the Re-
statement's test with the nonintervention, no-superseding-causes ap-
proach. In this way, the "directness" of the effect is analyzed. Then
the due process/minimum contacts concepts are applied to the par-
ticular set of facts.
This approach is intended to be flexible in order to effectuate
the congressional purpose to provide aggrieved citizens with access to
American courts and to promote uniformity of approach in actions
against foreign sovereigns.
V. CONCLUSION
Americans are increasingly in contact with foreign states and
their sovereign entities."'1 Whether for business or pleasure, for the
sale or purchase of some commodity or service, citizens and residents
make international transactions on a daily basis. In light of this
growing international interaction, a comprehensive provision of law
was "urgently needed."1 "" The FSIA is that comprehensive
provision.
The Act was intended to codify the restrictive principle of sover-
eign immunity and thereby to remove the issue from diplomatic pres-
sures, and to provide access to the courts. This access was to be pro-
vided by the Act's creation of an uniform system of federal law in
actions against foreign sovereigns. In this way, potential plaintiffs
would be on notice as to when they can have recourse to the courts,
and foreign states would be on notice as to when they may be subject
to the jurisdiction of an American court.
In order to effectuate these purposes, the courts must begin to
uniformly define the terms in the Act. It has been eight years since
the Act became effective. In that time no uniform analysis regarding
the terms "commercial activity" and "direct effect," two prerequi-
sites to establishing jurisdiction over a sovereign, has been articulated
or applied. For this reason, an approach to identify each of these
terms has been suggested by this comment. No rigid definitions have
been put forth because such rigid definitions would be impractical to
apply. Moreover, a rigid definition would very likely impede the ac-
cess to judicial review which Congress desired that the Act provide.
This approach is not intended as the definitive mode of analysis.
131. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
132. H.R. REP., supra note 2 at 6605.
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Rather, it has been suggested in the hope that it will stimulate judi-
cial re-evaluation of the meaning of the terms "commercial activity"
and "direct effect." This will thereby enable the courts to focus on
the congressional intent underlying the Act and to maintain and un-
derstand distinctions between jurisdiction under the Act and mini-
mum contacts jurisdiction.
Robert Byrd Hagedorn
